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Abstract
OWEN (1975) introduced linear production (LP) situations and TIMMER,B ORM and SUIJS
(1998) introduced more general situations involvingthe linear transformation of products (LTP).
They showed that the corresponding LTP games are totally balanced. In this paper we look at
LTP situations with an inﬁnite number of transformation techniques. The linear program that
calculates the maximal proﬁt, is a semi-inﬁniteprogram. We show thatan optimal solutionof the
dual program exists and that it is a core-element of the corresponding LTP game.
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1 Introduction
OWEN (1975) introduced linear production (LP) situations. These are production situations where
thereis aﬁniteset ofproducers,each ofthem ownsabundleofresources and all producerscan usethe
same ﬁnitesetof linearproductiontechniques. Theproductscan besoldonthe marketat givenprices
and all producers are price takers. This model has two restrictions. First, each production process
can only have one output good while many production processes have by-products. Second, all
producers can use the same productiontechniques while in reality some producers have a production
technique that nobody else has. To overcome these restrictions, TIMMER,B ORM and SUIJS (1998)
introduced situations involving the linear transformation of products (LTP). In these situations, each
lineartransformationtechniquehasatleastoneoutputgoodanddifferentproducersmayhavedifferent
production techniques. More precise, in an LTP situation there is a ﬁnite set of producers and each
of them controls a ﬁnite number of transformation techniques. We deﬁne the set of goods to be the
set of products and resources. Each producer owns a bundle of goods that he can use (like resources)
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1in his transformation process or that he can sell directly on the market (like products). The outcome
of the transformation process, the produced goods, will also be sold on the market. The goal of
each producer is to maximize his proﬁt given his transformation techniques, bundle of goods and the
exogenous market prices.
In thispaper, we considersemi-inﬁniteLTP situations,whichare LTP situationswitha countable,
inﬁnitenumber of transformationtechniques. Something similar for LP situationsand corresponding
games hasbeen studiedby FRAGNELLI,P ATRONE,S IDERI and TIJS (1999) usingdualityresultsby TIJS
(1979). We will also work with linear semi-inﬁnite programs. One of the ﬁrst papers in thisarea was
written by CHARNES,C OOPER and KORTANEK (1962). Many results on this subject can be found in
GLASHOFF and GUSTAFSON (1983) and in the recent book by GOBERNA and L´ OPEZ (1998).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with a formal introduction of ﬁnite LTP
situationsand correspondinggames. In section3 we extend thistosemi-inﬁniteLTP situationswhere
we consider a countable, inﬁnite number of transformation techniques. Some examples show what
problems we may encounter. Therefore, in each of the sections 4 and 5 a set of conditions will be
presented that ensures the existence of an optimal dual solution and the existence of a core-element
of the correspondingsemi-inﬁnite LTP game.
2 Finite LTP Situations and Games
Situations involving the linear transformation of products were introduced by TIMMER et al. (1998).
Toillustratethesesituations,considerthefollowingexample. Atailorusesa large pieceof silkfabric,
thread and buttons to produce full dresses. From the left-overs he makes some doll’s dresses. More
precise, assume that this tailorneeds a piece of silk fabric of 10 by 1.50 meters, 100 meters of thread,
70 buttons and 24 hours of labour to produce 6 full dresses and 2 doll’s dresses. Assuming that

































where the rows correspond from the top downward to respectively full dresses, doll’s dresses, pieces
of silkfabric, meters of thread, buttonsand hoursof labour. So, silkfabric, thread, buttonsand labour
are the input goods in this transformation process while full dresses and doll’s dresses are the output
goods. Sincetheproductiontechniqueislinear, anynonnegativemultipleofaisapossibleproduction
technique. The value of thisnonnegativemultipleis called the activity level. The activitylevel of this
tailor is restricted by the amount of input goods at his disposal.
2LTP situations4 are production situations in which each producer controls some transformation
techniques and a bundle of resource goods. Denote by M the ﬁnite set of goods and by N the ﬁnite
set of producers. Each producer i 2 N owns a bundle of goods !(i) 2 IR M
+ . A transformation
technique is denoted by a vector a 2 IR M and it says that a producer needs −aj units of the goods
j with aj < 0 to produce al units of the goods l with al > 0.I fa j=0for some good j, then this
good is not used in the transformation technique. We assume that each technique needs at least one
input good to produce at least one output good. Hence every vector a contains at least one positive
and one negative element. Denote by Di the set of transformation techniques controlled by producer
i,t h a ti s ,D i=f k jproducer i controls akg, and denote by yk the activity level of transformation
technique ak. Using transformation technique ak, a producer needs f−ak
jykjj 2 M : ak
j < 0g to
produce fak
jykjj 2 M : ak
j > 0g . We assume that the production process cannot be reversed, so
yk  0 for all k, and for any two players i;j 2 N the sets Di and Dj are disjoint,Di \ Dj = ;.
DenotebyD = [i2NDi theﬁnitesetofallavailabletransformationtechniques. Lety =( y k) k 2 D
be the vector in IR D
+ of all activity levels and let A be the technology matrix in IR M  D with kth
column ak. Deﬁne the related matrix G 2 IR M  D
+ with kth column gk by gk
j =m a x f 0 ;− a k
jgfor
all j 2 M. This matrix states which of the goods and how much of them are needed as inputs in
the various transformation processes when all activity levels equal one. If the activity level of ak
equals yk then a producer needs the bundle gkyk of goods to produce the bundle (ak + gk)yk since
ak
j + gk
j =m a x f a k
j;0 g .
Combining all his knowledge, producer i 2 N can use the bundle Gy of goods to produce the
bundle (A + G)y.H e r ey k=0if k= 2D ibecause producer i can only use his own transformation
techniques. The amount Gy of goods he uses, should not exceed the amount !(i) of goods at his
disposal, so Gy  !(i). Producer i starts with the bundle !(i) from which he uses Gy to produce
(A+G)y. Therefore, after the transformation,the produceris left withthebundle!(i)−Gy +(A+
G)y=!(i)+Ay which he can sell on the market at exogenous prices p 2 IR M
+ nf 0 g . We assume
thatthemarket isinsatiable,so, allgoodscan besold. Furthermore, allproducersare pricetakers. The
goal of each producer is to maximize his proﬁt from the sale of his remaining goods:
max pT(!(i)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( i )
y k =0i fk= 2D i
y0 :
Producers can alsocooperate by poolingtheirtransformationtechniquesandresources. The coalition
S  N, S 6= ;, of producers thenacts like one bigproducer withresource bundle!(S)=
P
i 2 S! ( i )
and D(S)=[ i 2 S D iis its set of available transformation techniques. The proﬁt maximization
4In TIMMER et al. (1998) these situations are called extended LTP situations.
3problem for this coalitionlooks as follows:
max pT(!(S)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( S )
y k =0i fk= 2D ( S )
y0 :
(1)
In short, an LTP situation is described by a 5-tuple hN;A;D;!;pi where ! =( ! ( i ))i2N.T h e
corresponding LTP game (N;v) is such that the characteristic function v assigns to each coalition
S  N the maximal proﬁt it can obtain as given in (1) and v(;)=0 .
One of the main issuesin cooperative game theory ishow todividethe beneﬁts from cooperation.











x i = v ( N ) ;
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x 2 C(v) is proposed as a distributionof the total proﬁt v(N), where producer i gets the amount xi,
thencoalitionS willget at least as much as it can obtainon itsown since
P
i2S xi  v(S). Therefore,
no coalition S has an incentive to leave the grand coalition N. A game is called balanced if it has a
nonempty core and it is called totallybalanced if each subgame (S;vjS) has a nonempty core, where
vjS is the game v restrictedto coalitionS with vjS(T)=v ( T)for all T  S. The followingtheorem,
b a s e do nat h e o r e mi nT IMMER et al. (1998), shows that LTP games are totally balanced.
Theorem 2.1 Let hN;A;D;!;pibe an LTP situation. Then the corresponding LTP game is totally
balanced.
Proof. Since each subgame (S;vjS) is an LTPgame, we only have to prove that theLTP game (N;v)
is balanced. For this, recall that the value v(N) for coalitionN equals
v(N) = max pT(!(N)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( N )
y  0 :
Note that pT!(N) is a constant. Therefore the corresponding dual minimization program is
min (z + p)T!(N)
s:t:G T z  A T p
z  0 :
(2)
Since the set of feasible solutions of this program, fz 2 IR M j G T z  A T p;z  0g, is nonempty,
closed, convex and bounded from below, this minimization problem can be solved and a minimum





i2N(z +p)T!(i)=( z+p ) T! ( N)=v ( N)where the lastequalityfollowsfrom
4duality theory. Notice that z is also a feasible solution of the problem minf(z + p)T!(S)jGTz 
!(S);z0 gfor all coalitionsS. Therefore,
(z + p)T!(S)  minf(z + p)T!(S)jGTz  !(S);z0 g
=m a x f p T ( ! ( S )+Ay)jGy  !(S);y0 g
 maxfpT(!(S)+Ay)jGy  !(S);y k=0i fk= 2D ( S ) ;y0 g





i2S(z + p)T!(i)=( z+p ) T! ( S)v ( S) . We conclude that x 2 C(v).
2
This proof shows that we can ﬁnd a core-element of the LTP game (N;v)via the dual program
correspondingtotheproﬁtmaximizationproblem. Thesetofcore-elementswecanﬁndinthiswayhas
been thoroughly studied for linear production situations by VAN GELLEKOM,P OTTERS,R EIJNIERSE,
TIJS and ENGEL (1998). In the next sections we will use this method to ﬁnd a core-element for the
LTP game corresponding to an LTP situationwith an inﬁnite number of transformation techniques.
3 Semi-Inﬁnite LTP Situations
In many production situations, there are an inﬁnite number of techniques available to the producer.
For example, a ﬁrm may have a ﬁnitenumber of transformationtechniquesonthe shortrun, butwhen
we think of the long run, this ﬁrm can choose from an inﬁnite number of techniques. It can continue
its current production process, it can expand its activities, it can produce some extra goods or it can
switchtotheuseofsomecompletelydifferenttransformationtechniques. Asecondexampleconcerns
cooking. If you have a recipe for baking pancakes from ﬂour, milk, eggs, butter and sugar, then you
cangetan inﬁnitenumber ofrecipes forpancakesbychangingthe amountsof theingredientsslightly.
Each recipe then gives a slightly different pancake.
We deﬁne a semi-inﬁnite LTP situation as a 5-tuple hN;A;D;!;piwhere the set D contains a
countable, inﬁnite number of transformation techniques. All other variables are as deﬁned in the
previous section. The following examples show some problems we may encounter in semi-inﬁnite
LTP situations.
Example 3.1 Consider the semi-inﬁnite LTP situation with a single producer, two goods, bundle of
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The primal proﬁt ’maximization’ problem is
sup pT(! + Ay)
s:t:G y  !
y  0 :
5Note that we have replaced the maximum by a supremum since there is an inﬁnitenumber of activity
levels and an optimal solutionmay not exist. This problem is equal to
supf3+p TAyj
P1
k=1(3 + 1=k)yk  3;y0 g= limk!1(3+ 3− 1=k)=6 :
There is no optimal solution for this problem, that is, there exists no vector ^ y of activity levels such
that pT(! + A^ y)=6 . The correspondingdual problem is
inff(z + p)T!jGTz  ATp; z  0g
=i n f f 3 z 1 +3 j (3+ 1=k)z1  3 − 1=k; k =1 ;2 ;:::; z0g
=3  1+3=6 :
The set of optimal solutions fz 2 IR 2 j z 1 =1 ;z 20 gis nonempty. In this example we see that the
primal problem may have no optimal solutionwhile the dual problem has optimal solutions.
Example 3.2 Consider the following semi-inﬁnite LTP situation with a single producer, two goods,












v =s u p f p T ( ! + Ay)jGy  !; y  0g
=s u p f 1+p TAyj
P1
k=1 yk=k  0;y0 g
=1 + 0 = 1
with optimal activity vector y =0 . The dual problem equals
inffz2 +1 jz 1=k  1 − 1=k; k =1 ;2 ;:::; z0g
=i n f f z 2 +1 jz 1k−1 ;k=1 ;2 ;:::; z0g=+ 1
since there existsno feasible solutionz. Therefore there are no optimal solutionsto the dual program
of this example while there exists an optimal solutionto the primal problem.














































































The proﬁt maximization problem gives
v =s u p f 2+p TAyj0  y1  1;y k=0 ;k=2 ;3 ;::: g=4 :
6The correspondingdual problem gives
inff2+2z 1j2z 12;2z 1+z 2=k  3;k=2 ;3 ;:::; z0g=5 :
Here we have a duality gap: the primal maximization program does not have the same optimal value
as the dual problem.
Theseexamplesshowthatsemi-inﬁniteLTPsituationsmay dealwithdualitygapsandtheabsence
of optimal solutionsfor both the primal and the dual program. We would like to have conditions on
semi-inﬁniteLTPsituationssuchthatthere isnodualitygap,thedualproblem hasanoptimalsolution
and the primal problem has a feasible solution. Then we can ﬁnd a core-element of the game via the
dualproblem. We donotneed the existenceof an optimalsolutionof theprimal problemto attainthis
core-element.
In the following two sections we present two sets of conditions that ensure we can ﬁnd a core-
element of the LTP game correspondingto a semi-inﬁnite LTP situationvia the dual problem.
4 Conditions Involving Cones
In this section we will present a ﬁrst set of conditions on semi-inﬁnite LTP situations and we show
that this guarantees that the corresponding LTP games have a nonempty core.
Denoteby 0M the M-dimensionalzero-vector and by ej thejth unitvectorinIR M withej
m =1if
m = j and ej
m =0if m 6= j.I fBis an (inﬁnite) set of vectors in IR q for some integer number q then
we obtain the convex cone generated by B, denoted by CC(B), by taking all nonnegative multiples










ibi; i0 ;b i2B; i =1 ;2 ;:::;t; t1
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The last equality for K1 follows from gk 2 IR M
+ for all k 2 D. In the literature, see for example
GLASHOFF and GUSTAFSON (1983)and GOBERNA and L´ OPEZ (1998),theconvex cones K1 and K2 are
usuallycalled the ﬁrst and second moment cone and denoted by M and N respectively. We renamed
these cones since we already use M and N to denote respectively the set of goods and the set of
producers. Denote by int(K1) the interior of K1 and by cl(K2) the closure of K2. Consider the
followingtwo conditions.
Condition 4.1
!(N) 2 int(K1)=I R M
++







A = 2 cl(K2)
An interpretation of this condition is that doing nothing, which is equivalent to activity level yk =0
for all k 2 D, cannot result in a positive proﬁt. The following theorem shows the nonemptiness of
the core under these conditions.
Theorem 4.3 Let hN;A;D;!;pi be a semi-inﬁnite LTP situation. If conditions 4.1 and 4.2 are
satisﬁedthen the correspondingLTP game is balanced.
Proof. Conditions 4.1 and 4.2 are satisﬁed and therefore it follows from respectively theorems
8:1:(v);(vi)and 4.4.(i)i nG OBERNA and L´ OPEZ (1998) that the dual problem for coalition N,
inf (z + p)T!(N)
s:t:G T z  A T p
z  0 ;
is feasible, there exists an optimal dual solutionand there is no duality gap. Let z be an optimal dual
solution. We can show in a similar way as in the proof of theorem 2.1 that x 2 IR N ,d e ﬁ n e db y
x i=( z+p ) T! ( i )for all i 2 N, is a core-element of the correspondingLTP game.
2
We will now return to our examples in the previous section. In the ﬁrst example we have that
gk =( 3+1
k;0)T and pTak =3−1
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We see that condition 4.2 is satisﬁed since (0;0;1)T = 2 cl(K2) but condition 4.1 is not satisﬁed
because !2 =0 . However, there is no duality gap and there exists an optimal dual solution.
In the second example we see that gk =( 1
k;0)T and pTak =1−1
kfor all k 2 D. Therefore
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:
8Herecondition4.1isnotsatisﬁedsince!1 =0andthesame holdsforcondition4.2since(0;0;1)T 2
cl(K2). The dual problem has no feasible solutions.
Finally, in the third example we have that g1 =( 2 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0)T, gk =( 2 ; 1
k ; 0 ; 0 ; 0)T, k  2,
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:
In this example, condition4.1 is not satisﬁed but condition4.2 is and there is a dualitygap.
From theseexamples we may concludethatconditions4.1 and4.2 are sufﬁcientbut notnecessary
conditionsin theorem 4.3.
5 Economic Conditions
In this section a second set of conditions on semi-inﬁnite LTP situations will be presented. These
conditionsalso guarantee total balancedness of the correspondingLTP games. Similar conditionsfor




pTak = γ<+ 1
All transformation techniquesak shouldgenerate a ﬁnite proﬁt of at most γ when yk =1 ,t h a ti s ,t h e





j  >0 for all k 2 D
This condition states that for each transformation technique there is always some positive amount 
of a resource needed at the unit activity level.
Recall that
v(N) = sup pT(!(N)+Ay)
s:t:G y  ! ( N )
y  0 :
WewillusethefollowingresultbyKARLIN and STUDDEN (1966),whichwetranslatedtosemi-inﬁnite
LTP situationsfor coalition N.
9Theorem 5.3 Suppose that v(N) is ﬁnite and that !(N) 2 IR M
++. Then there is no duality gap and
the dual programhas an optimal solution.
We can now prove the followingresult.
Theorem 5.4 Let hN;A;D;!;pi be a semi-inﬁnite LTP situation. If conditions 5.1 and 5.2 are
satisﬁedthen the correspondingLTP game is totallybalanced.
Proof. Since each subgame (S;vjS) of an LTP game isanother LTP game, we onlyhave toprove that
t h ec o r eo f( N;v)is nonempty.
By conditions 5.1 and 5.2 it follows that the dual feasible region fz 2 IR M
+ j G T z  A T p g is
nonempty since zT = γ−1(1;1;:::;1) is a feasible dual solution. It also follows that the primal
proﬁt maximization problem has a ﬁnite optimal proﬁt. From the result by KARLIN and STUDDEN,
theorem 5.3, it follows that if !(N) 2 IR M
++ then there is no duality gap and there exists an optimal
dual solutionz. As we have shown before, the vector x 2 IR N with xi =( z+p ) T! ( i )for all i 2 N
is an element of C(v).
If !(N) = 2 IR M
++ then one or more goods in M are not available, that is, there exists at least one
good j 2 M such that !j(N)=0 . We may eliminate these goods and all techniques that need a
positive amount of them since it is impossible to use these transformation techniques. This reduced
problem satisﬁes !j(N) > 0 for all non-eliminated goods j. Again by the result of KARLIN and
STUDDEN it follows that there is no duality gap in this reduced problem and there exists an optimal
solution ^ z. To obtainanelement ofC(v)we deﬁnezj =^ z jfor allnon-eliminatedgoodsj and zj =0
for all eliminated goods j. Then we can show in a similar way as in the proof of theorem 2.1 that
x 2 IR N , x i =( z+p ) T! ( i ) , is a core-element of the corresponding LTP game.
2
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